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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
rule. They have not shown an express agreement of this charac-
ter; they have not furnished any evidence that it was their prac-
tice, or the understanding between them and Josiah Lee & Co.,
that cash balances should stand and await the collection of paper
remitted to the party in whose favor a balance might exist.
The judgment must be reversed, and a new trial granted, with
costs to abide the event.
Ordered accordingly.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS. 1
,Spirituous Liguors-.Action, for Liguors ilegally consigned for sale-
Who is an Importer.-One who has consigned spirituous liquors to
another to be sold in violation of statute 1855, c. 215, cannot maintain
an action for the breach of an agreement by the consignee to render an
account of sales, pay the value of the liquors sold, and return the residue:
King vs. McEvoy.
One who receives from an importer, and duly forecloses, a mortgage
of a cask of spirituous liquors, which is in the United States warehouse,
in bond, and pays the duties and receives the cask of liquors, does not
thereby become the importer thereof, within the meaning of statute 1855,
c. 215, § 2: Id.
Common Carrier-Measure of Damages.-In an action against a carrier
to whom goods have been intrusted, for not delivering them according to
contract, the measure of damages is the value of the goods at the place
of delivery, and at the time when they should have been delivered; with
interest from that time : Spring vs. Haskell.
.Award-Partlity of.Arbitrator.-An award is rightly rejected if,
previously to the selection of the arbitrators, a portion of them made an
ex parte examination of the matter afterwards submitted to them, at the
i From Charles Allen, Esq., State Reporter.
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request of one of the parties, to whom the substance of the resu-t at
which they arrived was known, and these facts were not communicated to
the other party. So also, it is a good reason for setting aside an award,
and refusing to recommit it to the same arbitrators, if they decided upon
the matters submitted to them before giving notice of a hearing to one
of the parties: Conrad vs. .Massasoit Insurance Company.
Divorce--Recrimination.-A wife who has wilfully and utterly deserted
her husband for a period of five years, without fault on his part during
that time, cannot maintain a libel for divorce against him, on account of
his subsequent adultery. But she may maintain her libel, i, before the
expiration of the five years, he has taken another woman for his wife:
-Hall vs. Rall.
Infancy-Ratification of Contract made during Afinority.-A direct
promise, when of age, is necessary to establish a contract made during
minofity, and a mere acknowledgment will not have that effect: Proctor
vs. Sears.
- A conditional promise, when of age, to perform a contract made during
minority, will not sustain an action thereon, without proof that the condi-
tion has been fulfilled: -d.
Life Insurance--Suicide--Construction of Policy.-Suicide committed
by a person who understood the nature of the act, and intended to take
his own life, though committed during insanity, avoids a policy of life
insurance, which provides that it shall be void, if the assured shall die by
his own hand: Dean vs. American Mutual Life Insurance Co pnany.
Justice of the -eace-Action.-No action lies against a magistrate to
recover damages sustained by reason of his taking an invalid recogni-
sance: Way vs. Townsend.
Void Consideration of Contract.-No action lies on a promise by a
railroad company to pay to the widow of one who was killed by an acci-
dent on their railroad a certain sum of money, in consideration of her
forbearance to sue them for damages: palfrey vs. Portland, Saco, and
Portsmouth Railroad Com~n~any.
Estoppel-PuNia Officers not Agents of a C9ty.-A city is not estopped
from claiming land which it owns, by the wrongful act of its assessors in
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taxing it to a person who had no title to or possession of the same, or by
a collector's sale for non-payment of such tax: Rossire vs. City of Boston.
Fay.-A city is not liable for an injury caused by the combined effect
of the unsafe condition of a highway, and the unlawful or careless act of
a third person: Shepherd vs. Inhabitants of Chelsea.
Award-Presumption in favor of.-Tbe legal presumption, unless the
contrary appears, is, that arbitrators decide all the matters which are
submitted to them, and only those: Sperryg vs. Ricker.
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA. 1
Ejectment, efect of Verdict and Judgment on Equitabe it--TJudg-
meat in, how to be entered-Lien Docket, an Index next the record.-
Though one verdict and judgment in ejectment upon an equitable title is
conclusive between the parties, and a bar to any subsequent ejectment for
the same land, yet in order to have this effect, the judgment upon the
verdict must have been regularly entered on the record: it is not enough
that the jury fee was paid after verdict, and an entry thereof indexed in
the lien docket: Ferguson & Betts vs. Staver.
The lien docket is not the record of judgments, but only their essential
index: and the entry in the lien docket does not make the judgment, but
only refers to one supposed to be already made: id.
In an action of ejectment by F. & B., the holders of the legal title to
the undivided half of a tract of land, against S., who claimed under an
equitable title, a verdict was returned for the defendant, but, the charge
of the court being excepted to, no judgment was regularly entered upon
the verdict: the jury fee was paid by the defendant, and the verdict
indexed in the lien docket. A second ejectment for the same land, and
between the same parties, was brought, and a verdict found for the plain-
tiffs, upon which judgment was regularly entered, which was never re-
versed. Afterwards a third ejectment was brought by S. against F. & B.,
and a verdict rendered for the plaintiff, which was reversed by the Supreme
Court, and a new trial ordered. On the new trial, S., the plaintiff, set up
and relied upon the record of the verdict in the first ejectment as a bar to
defendant's recovery; whereon judgment was entered for the plaintiff by
I From Robert E. Wright, Esq., State Reporter, to be reported in the 4th volume
of hie Reports.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
the court below. Held, that the record was not a bar, and no defence, for
there had been no judgment entered upon the verdict, the payment of the
jury fee and the entry upon the lien docket not being equivalent thereto;
that there being a verdict and judgment in favor of the defendants,
F. & B., in the second ejectment, it was conclusive in their favor-and
that judgment should have been entered for them by the Court below: Id.
After-acguired Real Estate when included in general Devise-Act of
April 8th 1833 construed-Effect of electing to take or reject Property
given by Will.-One, by will dated in 1829, devised to his wife all the real
estate of which he should die possessed: in 1847 he purchased a farm,
which he held until his death, in 1850, when his widow entered into
possession under the will: in 1857 she sold the farm, taking as a part of
the purchase-money three judgment-bonds, and the same year died, leaving
a will, wherein she gave one half of the residue of her estate to her own
brothers and sisters, and the children of such as were deceased, and the
other half to the brothers and sisters of her deceased husband, and their
children. After her death, her executors issued executions upon the
judgment-bonds, given for the farm sold by her, which were stayed by
the Court, and the defendant-the purchaser-let into a defence, upon
the ground that the title was not in the widow, but in the heirs of her
husband. Held,
That the will of the testator, executed in 1829, did not pass the farm
purchased by him in 1847, as the 10th section of the Act of 8th April
1833, providing that real estate acquired by the testator after the date of
his will shall pass by a general devise, did not apply to a will dated before
its passage: Gables E xecutors vs. Daub.
But that, if the heirs of the testator, who were his brothers and sisters,
and their children, and who, under the will of the wife, were entitled to
one-half of all the property of which she died possessed, including the
judgment-bonds given for the purchase of the farm, should elect to take
under that will, their title would pass to the defendant, the purchaser, and
the plaintiffs, her executors, were entitled to recover on the judgment-
bonds given by him, as the words of the will of the testator were sufficient
to include after-acquired real estate, and his heirs could not claim both
.under and against her will: Id.
Executors, Idabift of, for Interest-Partial Distribution allowed where
.absent Distributees are secured-Payment into Court by Executor when
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proper- Grandchildren when not included in term (ildren.-Where the
assets of a decedent's estate are invested and drawing interest, the execu-
tors, after filing their account, are chargeable with interest upon the
balance for distribution therein up to the date of the final decree, even
though they have charged themselves with the principal of the uncollected
securities; and it was not error in the Orphans' Court to confirm an audi-
tor's report, wherein, upon part of the fund, interest was charged from the
date of a former auditor's report and upon the balance, froin the date of
-the confirmation of the first account by the Supreme Court, up to the filing
of the second report though the first auditor's report was filed before the
confirmation of the first account, and in the second, the auditor went back
of that account as confirmed to the date of the first report, as a period
from which to calculate the interest upon a part of the fund: Appeal of
Gable's Executors.
It is not error to permit a partial distribution of an estate (a share in
which is claimed by one whose right as a legatee under the will had not
been determined), if, in the opinion of the Orphans' Court, enough of the
estate remains thereafter to satisfy the claim when it should be established;
if not, a sufficient sum should be set apart and invested under the direc-
tion of the Court to abide the event: Id.
Where the names and number of the children of one of those entitled
under the will, who died before testatrix, had not been ascertained; it was
not error in the Orphans' Court to order the share of the father to be paid
into Court, to await further order and decree; for in this way the execu-
tors would be relieved from responsibility, and the distribution to each
child made as by law entitled: Id.
A testatrix by will divided the residue of her estate into two parts, giving
one half to her brothers and sisters of the whole blood, and the children
of such of them as were deceased, share and share alike, the children of
each deceased brother or sister to take together for their share, an amount
equal to the share of a surviving brother or sister, and no more; the other
half of her estate was given to the brothers and sisters of her deceased
husband and their children in similar terms. Reld, that under the will
"grandchildren" were excluded, and were not entitled to any portion of
the estate, as the word "children" in itself did not include "grandchild-
ren" or "issue"-therefore it was error in the Orphans' Court to award
any portion of the estate to the grandchildren of the deceased brothers
and sisters of testatrix, or those of the brothers and sisters of her deceased
husband: Id.
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Conditional Subscription to Railroad Companies-Deence to Action
for Instalments on Stock.-One subscribed in 1853 for twenty shares of
the stock of the Pittsburgh and Connellsville Railroad Company on the
express condition that the company "should locate and construct their
railroad along the route contemplated by the Meyer's Mill Plank-Road
Company for their road," paid one instalment, part of the second, but
delayed the payment of the balance as the calls were made, until the
company, before the road was constructed along the route mentioned,
suspended operations, after which payment was refused on the ground
that though the road had been located by the company, they had not
constructed it, according to the condition in the subscription. In an
action brought therefor by the company it was Held,
1. That the promise of subscription being precedent to that of con-
struction upou the part of the company, the defendant could not insist
upon performance by the railroad company while he refused performance
on his part; and that the road having been located as stipulated, and
completed so far as the means of the company would allow, it was a com-
pliance with the condition, and the plaintiffs were entitled to recover:
.Miller vs. IThe Pittsburgh and Connellsville Railroad Company.
2. That the condition in the contract of subscription was not a con-
dition precedent, and did not require the completion of the road before
payment could be r6quired, but only that when located and constructed it
Ahould occupy the route designated, the undertaking being, on the part
of the subscriber, to pay as calls should be made by the directors, and on
the part of the company to locate as stipulated and construct as fast as
their means would allow: Id.
3. That the suspension of operations made by the directors, long after
the payments upon defendant's stock had been due, was not a defence in
an action brought against him for the unpaid balance thereon: Id.
4. Where the company had received subscriptions on a guarantee that
they would pay interest on stock "as soon as paid," until the road was
finished, interest would not accrue until the stock was fully paid; and
where but a small part of the stock had been paid for by the defendant,
he could not, in a suit against him for the balance, set up the non-
payment of interest on his stock by the company as a breach of con-
dition: Id.
Custom of Mferchants as toa-edit on Sale of Goods-Evidence of, in
Action for Goods sold and delivered.-Where suit was brought for a bill
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of goods sold more than six years before, and the Statute of Limitations
was pleaded; evidence of the practice and custom of the trade to sell
goods upon a system of credits, was held inadmissible for the purpose of
proving that the price was not to be paid when the goods were sold, but
on a certain date thereafter, so as to avoid the bar of the statute by
showing that the bill was not due until within the six years; and it was
error in the Court below to receive the evidence and refer it to the jury
as testimony from which they might infer a contract different in terms
from that exhibited in the account: Rurs vs. North, Chase & North.
But if any such general custom had been proved, or a special custom
affecting the peculiar locality or trade, it would have been the law of the
contract, and both parties would have been bound by it: Id.
The usage and practice of the firm, though not good as a custom,
would have been binding, if expressly made part of the contract, or shown
to have been known and assented to by the defendant at the time: and
evidence of such a contract, either direct, or by proving a course of deal-
ing between the parties on such terms, and of such frequency, as to justify
the inference that the transaction was on the accustomed terms, is ad-
missible: .d.
lien of prior Execution, when postponed to subseguent one by conduct
of Plaintiff.-If an execution be issued, not for the enforcement of
the judgment by levy and sale, but for the purpose of a lien, and to
acquire security for the debt, it will be postponed to a subsequent
execution issued in good faith: Freeburger's Appeal.
Where the plaintiffs in the prior execution alleged that they had
given orders to the sheriff to proceed and sell before the second execution
came into his hands, they must prove the fact affirmatively, or their
execution will lose its priority: Id.
Where one of the plaintiffs and his attorney instructed the sheriff,
when the execution was placed in his hands, "not to proceed until
further orders ;" afterwards, that he "should make a levy, but not sell;"
and subsequently, by arrangement, permitted the debtor to have access to
the property levied, giving him the keys of the shop, it is sufficient
evidence that their execution was not issued to collect the judgment-debt,
but for another purpose, which was not legitimate nor protected by the
law: Id.
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COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY.1
JDower-Right to a Sum in gross in lieu of.-In proceedings for parti.
tion, where after a sale of the premises the widow, who was entitled to
dower therein, had agreed in writing under her hand and seal, according
to the statutes of this State, to accept in lieu of her said dower such sum
in gross as the Chancellor should deem reasonable, and then having died
before distribution, it was held, that the right vested in the widow to
receive a sum in gross, interest could not be divested by her death, but
should go to her children. Beld further, that the value of the widow's
interest should be ascertained on the principles of life annuities: .Afuford
vs. hiers.
Where the estate is ordered to be sold, and the widow agrees to accept
a gross sum in lieu of dower, and she dies before a sale of the premises,
her estate is determined by her death, and her children can have no claim
to any portion of the proceeds of the sale: Id.
Railroad--Construction of Charter-Terminus.-The charter of the
defendants contained the following clause: "the president and directors
of said company be and they are hereby authorized and invested with all
the rights and powers necessary and expedient to survey, lay out, and
construct a railroad from some suitable point in the township of Orange,
in the county of Essex, to some suitable point in Orange street, or some
street north of the said street, or south of Market street, in the city of
Newark."
Beld, that this enactment relates not to the route, but to the termination
of the road, and that thereby the road of the company was not excluded
from being located in or through Iarket street: .McFarland vs. The
Orange, &c., Horse Car Railroad Company.
Corporation- Transfer of Stock in Blank-Collateral Security.-
Shares in a corporation, whose charter provides that the capital stock of
the company shall be deemed personal estate, and "be transferable upon
the books of the said corporation," can be effectually transferred as col-
lateral security for a debt, as against a creditor of the bailor, who attaches
them without notice of any transfer, by a delivery of the certificates
thereof, together with a blank irrevocable power of attorney for the trans-
fer thereof from the bailor to the bailee: The Broadway Bank vs.
Thomas ecElrath.
I From Mercer Beasley, Esq., Reporter of the Court, to be reported in the 2d
volume of his Reports.
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31. delivered to the complainants the certificates of certain stock of a
corporation, accompanied by a power of attorney irrevocable for the
transfer thereof, as collateral security for certain of his notes, and the
renewals thereof. The charter of said corporation provided that its capital
stock should be deemed personal estate, and "be transferable upon the
books of said corporation: and further, "that books of transfer of stock
should be kept, and should be evidence of the ownership of said stock in
all elections and other matters submitted to the decision'of the stock-
holders of said corporation." A creditor of 1. then levied an attachment
upon this stock. Held, that the transfer to the complainants was effectual
as against such attaching creditor: Id.
Divorce-Desertion.-To establish a case of desertion sufficient to autho-
rize a divorce, it should appear that the wife left her husband of her own
accord, without his consent and against his will, or that she obstinately
refused to return without just cause on the request of her husband:
Jennings vs. ,Jennings.
Desertion cannot be inferred from the mere unaided fact that the parties
do not live together : Id.
Bridge between two States-Compact between Pennsylvania and New
Jerse~y-Exclusive Franchise- Constitutional Law.-Upon principles of
public law, it is clear that the power of erecting a bridge, and taking tolls
thereon, over a navigable river which forms the coterminous boundary
between two States, can only be conferred by the concurrent legislation
of both States: The President, Manages, &c., vs. The Trenton City
Bridge Company1 and Others.
When the power to make and maintain such bridge, and take tolls
thereon, has been given by the joint legislature of both States, the prin-
ciple could hardly be admitted, that either State, by its separate legisla-
tion, could declare that no other bridge should be built across such river
within certain limits, and thus render the franchise exclusive: Id.
By the agreement entered into between the States of New Jersey and
Pennsylvania, the river Delaware, in its whole length and breadth, is to
be and remain a common highway equally free and open for the use of
both States, and each State is to enjoy and exercise concurrent jurisdiction
within and upon the water between the shores of said river. Both States
concurred 1h granting to complainants the right to erect and maintain
their bridge, and take tolls thereon. The legislature of New Jersey after.
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wards passed an act declaring "that it should not be lawful for any person
or persons whatsoever to erect, or cause to be erected, any other bridge or
bridges across the said river Delaware at any place or places within three
miles of the bridge to be erected."
Held, that even if it was the intention that this act should take effect
without the assent of the State of Pennsylvania, that it is void on the
ground that it is in contravention of the agreement above mentioned
between the two States. As neither State, by the exercise of her sole
jurisdiction, has the right, by the terms of the agreement, to grant the
franchise, so neither can lawfully contract to refuse to grant it: Id.
Under the circumstances, as exhibited in the case, it was further held,
that the Act of 1801, which conferred the exclusive privilege on the
complainants, was not designed by the legislature of New Jersey to go
into effect until the same had received the assent of the legislature of
Pennsylvania: Id.
Whether a corporation has violated its charter, or forfeited its franchise,
is a question solely for the determination of a court of law: Id.
But when a bridge company, setting up an exclusive right within cer-
tain limits, asks an injunction to prohibit the building a bridge within
such limits, a court of equity will not lend its assistance when it appears
from the answer that the bridge of the complainants has been so far
appropriated to the uses of a railroad as to render it inconvenient and
dangerous for ordinary travel: Id.
endor and endee-Assumption of Horgage-Debt.-Where one pur-
chases land, and assumes in his deed to pay off a bond and mortgage of
his grantor, to which such land is subject, he thereby becomes a surety in
respect to the mortgage-debt: Klapworth vs. Dressier & Ise.
This obligation of the purchaser to pay the debt enures in equity to
the benefit of the mortgagee, and he may enforce it against the purchaser
to the extent of the deficiency in a bill to foreclose: Id.
Trust-Fraudulent Conveyance-Religious Cororation-Restriction
on Alienatio.-The trustees of a religious, literary, or other benevolent
association, irrespective of any special power conferred by their charters,
cannot purchase and hold real estate under trusts of their own creation
which shall protect their property from the reach of their creditors:
.Magie vs. The German Evangelical Dutch Church of Newark.
Where property is given to a corporation in trust for a charitable use,
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the trust is the creature of the donor, and he may impose upon it such
character, conditions, and qualifications as he may see fit: Id.
But the case is widely different where a corporation attempts, by means
of its own devising, however honest and well intentioned, to place its own
property beyond the reach of its creditors: Id.
The premises in question, and upon which the defendants had erected
a house of worship, were conveyed to them for the consideration of one
thousand dollars. The deed was an absolute conveyance in fee upon
certain trusts that the property should be held as a Lutheran Church for
ever, &c., and contained a clause that the grantee should not by deed
alienate, dispose of, or otherwise charge or encumber said property, &c.
The corporation executed a mortgage to secure a legitimate debt:
Red, that the corporation had the legal title to the land, and the power
at law of executing the mortgage, and that there was no equity in refus-
ing to enforce the mortgage for the payment of an honest debt of the
corporation under color of protecting a charitable use: Id.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK.'
Writ of Pro~hZition.-The writ of prohibition does not issue to correct
errors or irregularities in administering justice by inferior courts, but to
prevent courts from going beyond their jurisdiction in the exercise of
judicial power in matters over which they have no cognisance: 21e
People, ex rel. Brownson, vs. MAfarine Court of New York.
It ought not to issue where the party has a complete remedy in some
other and more ordinary form: Id.
The writ will not be issued upon the ground that the affidavits on which
proceedings by attachment were founded did not show certain matters
which were necessary to justify the issuing of the attachment: d.
Nor will it be issued on the ground that the debt for which the plain-
tiff was entitled to sue in the court below, was larger than the jurisdiction
of that court permitted to be recovered there; provided the plaintiff, to
obviate that difficulty, remits all beyond the amount of which the court
has jurisdiction: Id.
Principal and Agent.--An agent cannot act for his own benefit in rela-
tion to the subject-matter of the agency, to the injury of his principal:
Bruc.e et al. vs. Davenport.
I From the Hon. 0. L. Barbour, Reporter of the Court.
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An agent is bound to follow the instructions of his principal; and if be
neglects to do so he will make himself liable for the loss or damage which
his principal sustains: Id.
The plaintiffs were employed by T. D., in behalf of himself and
J. D., who were partners, as their brokers and agents, to sell a cer-
tain promissory note held by them, made by third persons, and were
instructed to sell the same at a discount of twelve per cent., without their
indorsement and without recourse. Subsequently the plaintiffs called
upon J. D., in the absence of T. D., and, by falsely stating that T. D.
had before indorsed similar notes which the plaintiffs had been employed
to sell, and concealing from him the fact that T. D. had instructed them
to sell without recourse, procured from him the indorsement of the name
of the firm upon the note. Held, that the indorsement having been
obtained by an abuse of the confidential relation of principal and agent,
did not constitute a contract upon which the latter could sue the former:
Id.
Held, also, that for the same reasons the indorsement could not be con-
sidered a modification of the instructions to sell without recourse; and
that, for whatever damage the principals had sustained by the disregard
of their instructions, the agents were liable: Id.
Deed-Exception.-A grantee, by accepting a deed containing an
exception of certain lands previously sold and conveyed to another, and
then entering into the possession of the lands thus excepted, will be
deemed in law to have entered in subserviency to the title of the grantee
of the excepted land, and to continue to hold in subserviency thereto;
unless he can establish the contrary by some clear and unequivocal act or
claim of title in himself: Rosseel vs. Wickhsam.
Fire Insurance; wlw can sue on Policy.-Policies of insurance are not
deemed, in their nature, incidents to the property insured, and do not
cover any interest which a person other than the insured may have in the
property, as heir, grantee, mortgagde, or creditor, unless there be a valid
assignment of the policy: -Wyman vs. Prosser.
The contract of insurance being a mere personal contract, in no way
attached to or running with the real property insured, it does not pass
with it, either to a grantee or an heir. The executor or administrator is
the only one who can take the contract and enforce it: Id.
